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Colombia:	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Laura	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  Nake	  M.	  Kamrany,	  Danielle	  N.	  Ramirez	  
	  
The	  recent	  global	  transition	  to	  a	  more	  diffuse	  distribution	  of	  economic	  power	  
points	  to	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  global	  growth	  from	  rich	  to	  low-­‐	  and	  middle-­‐	  
income	  economies.	  Colombia	  may	  be	  a	  prime	  example	  as	  its	  recent	  rapid	  per	  capita	  
income	  growth	  of	  10.2%	  on	  average	  since	  1999	  points	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  
Colombia's	  convergence	  to	  the	  ranks	  of	  rich	  countries.	  However,	  Colombia's	  
economic	  growth	  has	  been	  constrained	  by	  over	  40	  years	  of	  a	  costly	  and	  ineffective	  
drug	  war	  policy	  that	  has	  failed.	  The	  illicit	  activity	  of	  drug	  production	  and	  trafficking	  
grosses	  approximately	  $10-­‐$20	  billion	  a	  year;	  it	  does	  not	  enter	  into	  the	  GDP	  
accounting.	  In	  addition,	  the	  FARC	  (Revolutionary	  Armed	  Forces	  of	  Colombia)	  has	  
stifled	  Colombia's	  drive	  towards	  economic	  prosperity.	  Barring	  the	  social	  and	  
political	  impasse,	  the	  economy	  would	  flourish.	  
Inequality	  in	  distribution	  of	  wealth,	  land,	  and	  income	  in	  Colombia,	  which	  is	  
among	  the	  highest	  in	  the	  world,	  is	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  ongoing	  conflict.	  The	  result	  
appears	  to	  be	  in	  part	  an	  abandonment	  of	  legitimate	  market	  activity,	  and	  an	  
entrenchment	  of	  violence	  that	  threatens	  to	  undermine	  future	  growth.	  	  	  
Drug	  trafficking	  dominates	  the	  Colombian	  black	  market	  economy;	  Cocaine	  is	  
produced	  at	  $1,500/kilo	  and	  is	  sold	  in	  American	  streets	  for	  as	  much	  as	  
$50,000/kilo.	  	  With	  so	  much	  profit	  to	  be	  made	  in	  drug	  trafficking,	  many	  government	  
officials	  fall	  victim	  to	  temptation.	  	  This	  is	  part	  the	  reason	  why	  Plan	  Colombia	  has	  
only	  provided	  the	  world	  with	  false	  hope.	  	  Colombians	  have	  rightfully	  lost	  faith	  in	  
their	  government	  and	  crime	  goes	  largely	  unreported,	  which	  only	  provides	  more	  
incentives	  and	  opportunities	  for	  criminals	  who	  have	  little	  fear	  of	  being	  caught.	  	  
Moreover,	  the	  aid	  from	  Plan	  Colombia	  ends	  up	  targeting	  poor	  Colombian	  
farmers,	  only	  strengthening	  the	  leftist	  guerilla	  groups	  and	  drug	  cartels	  that	  Plan	  
Colombia	  is	  intended	  to	  uproot.	  	  The	  Colombian	  government	  has	  been	  at	  war	  with	  
these	  organizations	  since	  1966.	  	  Plan	  Colombia	  has	  instigated	  violence	  from	  the	  
FARC	  because	  it	  focuses	  resources	  on	  aerial	  herbicide	  spraying	  to	  kill	  the	  coca	  
plants	  that	  cocaine	  comes	  from.	  	  The	  herbicides	  are	  also	  killing	  the	  legal	  crops	  of	  the	  
small	  Colombian	  farmers.	  	  Moreover,	  farmers	  complain	  that	  the	  herbicides	  damage	  
their	  health	  and	  water.	  These	  farmers	  suffer	  unremunerated	  losses	  and	  resentment	  
grows.	  	  They,	  in	  turn,	  support	  the	  leftist	  groups	  who	  protect	  them	  from	  the	  injustice	  
of	  the	  government,	  and	  rely	  on	  these	  groups	  to	  bring	  drug	  crops	  to	  market	  through	  
an	  inhospitable	  environment	  at	  high	  profits	  to	  the	  guerillas.	  
To	  combat	  this	  resentment,	  Colombia	  must	  address	  corruption	  and	  dramatic	  
income	  and	  land	  inequality.	  	  Corruption	  has	  led	  to	  a	  loss	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  government	  
amongst	  the	  Colombian	  population.	  	  Corruption	  must	  be	  rooted	  out	  of	  the	  
government	  so	  that	  it	  can	  finally	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  drug	  problem	  and	  the	  violence	  
and	  crimes	  that	  come	  with	  it	  through	  public	  trust.	  	  Taken	  together,	  addressing	  these	  
problems,	  the	  Colombian	  government,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  international	  forces,	  must	  
make	  it	  economically	  unappealing	  for	  the	  FARC’s	  guerilla	  fighters	  to	  continue	  
fighting	  in	  support	  of	  the	  FARC’s	  leaders	  and	  their	  ideology.	  	  Economic	  incentives	  
and	  transition	  must	  be	  offered	  to	  these	  fighters	  that	  surpass	  the	  benefits	  they	  
receive	  for	  fighting	  and	  help	  them	  become	  part	  of	  productive	  economic	  activity.	  	  
No	  doubt	  the	  FARC’s	  mission	  will	  become	  superfluous	  when	  Columbia’s	  per	  capita	  
income	  rises	  and	  distribution	  becomes	  more	  equitable.	  	  	  Indeed,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
FARC-­‐Government	  conflict	  would	  also	  free	  many	  of	  Colombia’s	  resources	  that	  would	  
be	  put	  to	  better	  uses	  instead	  of	  being	  wasted	  on	  the	  exhausting	  civil	  war.	  	  Also,	  
currently	  the	  FARC	  provides	  armed	  protection	  for	  the	  Colombian	  drug	  cartels	  that	  
operate	  out	  of	  the	  land	  that	  the	  FARC	  controls.	  	  Without	  this	  strong	  demand	  for	  
protection,	  the	  drug	  cartels	  would	  be	  automatically	  weakened.	  	  With	  the	  major	  drug	  
cartels	  gone,	  peace	  could	  invade	  Colombia.	  
	  
II	  	  -­‐	  Colombia’s	  Economic	  Prospects	  
	  
Colombia,	  nestled	  in	  the	  northern	  part	  of	  South	  America,	  with	  46	  million	  
people	  and	  a	  GDP	  of	  $333.4	  billion,	  is	  the	  fourth	  largest	  economy	  in	  the	  continent.	  	  
Although	  Colombia’s	  per	  capita	  GDP	  is	  well	  below	  the	  United	  States’,	  following	  a	  





Despite	  economic	  shocks,	  Colombia	  has	  experienced	  solid	  growth	  since	  the	  
1980s,	  avoiding	  most	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  debt	  crisis	  at	  that	  time	  which	  
negatively	  impacted	  the	  rest	  of	  Latin	  America.	  	  Notably,	  however	  that	  growth	  has	  
been	  accompanied	  by	  an	  increase	  in	  volatility,	  and	  in	  the	  1980s	  was	  reduced	  by	  
reductions	  in	  total	  factor	  productivity.	  (Riascos	  &	  Vargas,	  2011)	  
Considering	  recent	  increases	  in	  Colombia’s	  GDP	  per	  capita	  at	  10%	  per	  
annum,	  there	  is	  great	  potential	  for	  economic	  convergence,	  and	  in	  fact,	  estimates	  
point	  to	  a	  possible	  convergence	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita	  between	  Colombia	  and	  the	  United	  
States	  in	  roughly	  29	  years,	  i.e.	  by	  the	  year	  2040.	  	  	  Modeling	  Colombia’s	  future	  
growth	  through	  mean	  projection,	  ordinary	  least	  squares	  trends	  and	  evidence	  of	  
unconditional	  income	  convergence	  is	  shown	  by	  looking	  at	  both	  quintile	  regression,	  
all	  point	  to	  a	  similar	  time	  frame	  for	  economic	  convergence.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  presence	  
of	  an	  S-­‐shaped	  growth	  explains	  the	  observed	  rapid	  progression	  of	  per	  capita	  income	  
convergence.	  	  	  This	  reconciles	  the	  current	  observations	  with	  the	  well-­‐documented	  
stylized	  hypothesis	  of	  twin	  peak	  distribution	  of	  income.	  	  
Over	  the	  past	  century	  the	  world	  has	  become	  increasingly	  globalized.	  	  With	  
this,	  a	  trend	  of	  per	  capita	  GDP	  convergence	  can	  be	  observed	  between	  already	  
developed	  and	  developing	  countries.	  Kamrany	  and	  Vassilev	  (2010)explain	  the	  
drivers	  of	  economic	  conversion:	  “This	  converging	  process	  is	  mainly	  achieved	  
through	  the	  successful	  transfer	  and	  implementation	  of	  technologies	  by	  developed	  
countries	  to	  less-­‐developed	  countries.	  Using	  developed	  countries	  such	  as	  the	  United	  
States	  of	  America	  as	  a	  benchmark;	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  respective	  
growth	  rate	  of	  the	  GDP	  per	  capita	  income	  of	  less	  developed	  countries.”	  	  The	  
phenomenon	  we	  observe	  in	  Colombia	  is	  consistent	  with	  this	  recent	  global	  transition	  
from	  stagnant	  economic	  growth	  performance	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  to	  dynamic	  
growth.	  	  It	  corresponds	  with	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  economic	  growth	  in	  favor	  
of	  low	  and	  middle-­‐income	  countries	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  such	  as	  China,	  India,	  




Looking	  at	  Colombia’s	  economic	  indicators,	  there	  are	  several	  positive	  trends	  
that	  make	  convergence	  possible.	  	  Colombia	  is	  experiencing	  enhanced	  productivity	  
and	  a	  shift	  from	  relatively	  low-­‐value	  added	  industries	  to	  higher	  value-­‐added	  
industries.	  	  Colombia’s	  annual	  growth	  rate	  of	  per	  capita	  productivity	  (income)	  of	  
Columbia	  as	  well	  as	  its	  advances	  in	  technological	  growth,	  abundance	  of	  natural	  
resources,	  control	  of	  fertility	  rate	  and	  educated	  labor	  force	  place	  it	  among	  the	  
middle	  income	  countries	  which	  are	  poised	  to	  reach	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  first	  world	  
within	  the	  21st	  century.	  	  The	  World	  Bank	  reports	  Colombia’s	  capital	  formation	  (as	  a	  
percent	  of	  GDP)	  as	  23%	  in	  2011	  compared	  to	  the	  U.S.’s	  15%.	  	  The	  valued	  added	  of	  
the	  industry	  sector,	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP,	  is	  relatively	  close	  for	  the	  two	  countries	  
with	  Colombia	  at	  38%	  and	  the	  U.S.	  at	  20%.	  	  Problematically,	  the	  United	  States’	  value	  
added	  of	  the	  services	  sector	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  is	  well	  over	  that	  of	  Colombia’s	  
with	  79%	  and	  55%	  in	  2010	  respectively.	  	  	  Colombia	  is	  more	  agricultural,	  7%	  of	  its	  
GDP	  comes	  from	  agriculture,	  compared	  to	  roughly	  1%	  for	  the	  United	  States	  in	  2011.	  	  
Colombia’s	  inflation	  was	  high	  but	  not	  overly	  problematic	  7%	  in	  2011	  compared	  to	  
the	  U.S.’s	  2%	  in	  the	  same	  year.	  	  	  Colombia’s	  external	  debt,	  while	  relevant	  to	  its	  
economic	  prospects,	  is	  not	  overly	  pressing	  as	  the	  51st	  most	  indebted	  nation	  in	  the	  
world.	  (“World	  Development	  Indicators,”	  n.d.)	  
Social	  indicators,	  indicate	  a	  generally	  positive	  environment	  for	  economic	  
growth.	  	  Adult	  literacy	  in	  Colombia	  is	  at	  93%	  compared	  with	  99%	  in	  the	  United	  
States.	  	  Life	  expectancy	  is	  75	  years	  in	  Colombia	  compared	  to	  78.4	  in	  the	  United	  
States.	  	  Infant	  mortality	  is	  still	  problematically	  just	  over	  double	  that	  of	  the	  United	  
States	  at	  15.92	  per	  1000	  in	  2012,	  and	  birth	  rates	  remain	  slightly	  higher	  in	  Colombia	  
at	  17.23	  per	  1000	  compared	  to	  the	  U.S.’s	  13.70	  per	  1000.	  	  (“CIA	  World	  Factbook:	  
Colombia,”	  2012))	  	  
Early	  Colombian	  development	  was	  largely	  driven	  by	  industrial	  policies	  that	  
began	  in	  the	  1950s.	  	  These	  policies	  included	  trade	  protection	  and	  tax	  exemptions.	  
Significant	  growth,	  industrialization	  and	  modernization	  have	  taken	  place,	  but	  only	  
after	  the	  debt	  crisis	  of	  the	  1980s	  that	  was	  a	  result	  of	  these	  measures.	  (Meléndez	  &	  
Perry,	  2010)	  
In	  recent	  years,	  however,	  Colombia	  has	  experienced	  a	  renaissance	  in	  the	  
deployment	  of	  modern	  technologies	  and	  systematic	  industrial	  policies.	  	  Ostensibly,	  
Colombian	  leadership	  has	  promoted	  industrial	  and	  services	  upgrading.	  	  The	  
agricultural	  sector	  used	  to	  be	  the	  biggest	  for	  Colombia	  but	  has	  since	  been	  surpassed	  
by	  the	  services	  and	  industrial	  sectors.	  Currently	  the	  services	  sector	  makes	  up	  over	  
half	  of	  GDP,	  whilst	  the	  industrial	  sector	  follows	  not	  too	  far	  behind	  with	  37.6%.	  	  
Other	  drivers	  of	  growth	  and	  prosperity	  include	  the	  rapid	  growth	  of	  trade	  and	  
finance,	  a	  growing	  equity	  market,	  public	  finance,	  educational	  development	  and	  
incentives	  to	  attract	  more	  trade	  and	  talent.	  	  (“World	  Development	  Indicators,”	  n.d.)	  
International	  investment,	  as	  well	  as	  tourism,	  has	  greatly	  increased	  over	  the	  
recent	  years,	  largely	  in	  part	  to	  the	  Santos	  administration’s	  favorable	  commercial	  
relations	  and	  crackdown	  on	  corruption	  and	  the	  drug	  war.	  Moreover,	  the	  country	  is	  
currently	  awaiting	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  free	  trade	  agreement	  with	  the	  United	  
States.	  	  Colombia	  is	  also	  negotiating	  other	  free	  trade	  agreements	  with	  additional	  
countries.	  	  (CIA	  The	  World	  Factbook)	  
However,	  Colombia	  seems	  caught	  in	  a	  web	  of	  violence,	  drug	  trade	  and	  
corruption	  that	  may	  hamper	  its	  long	  run	  growth	  potential.	  	  Political	  indicators	  could	  
be	  harbingers	  of	  slow	  growth	  ahead(Perotti,	  1996).	  	  Political	  indicators	  show	  wide	  
spread	  corruption	  and	  lawlessness,	  despite	  being	  Latin	  America’s	  longest	  running	  
republic.	  	  The	  World	  Bank’s	  governance	  indicators	  for	  2011	  show	  some	  
improvement	  since	  2009,	  but	  the	  picture	  is	  not	  promising	  political	  stability	  scored	  -­‐
1.25,	  rule	  of	  law	  is	  at	  -­‐.26,	  control	  of	  corruption	  at	  -­‐.31,	  and	  accountability	  at	  -­‐.15.	  
(“Worldwide	  Governance	  Indicators,”	  n.d.)	  	  	  Colombian	  welfare	  is	  distributed	  
unequally	  across	  Colombia,	  and	  in	  regions	  like	  Montes	  de	  Maria,	  politicians	  use	  aid	  
for	  development	  money	  for	  their	  own	  personal	  gain	  and	  eliminate	  companies	  that	  
would	  bring	  actual	  development	  to	  the	  region.	  (Acemoglu	  &	  Robinson,	  2012c)	  Thus	  
corruption	  is	  a	  real	  impediment	  to	  development,	  especially	  in	  the	  poorest	  regions	  of	  
Colombia.	  	  	  	  
Ongoing	  violence	  in	  Colombia	  undermines	  stability	  and	  economic	  growth.	  
Several	  authors	  have	  attempted	  to	  understand	  the	  impact	  of	  violence	  on	  Growth	  in	  
Colombia.	  	  Colombia	  has	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  highest	  homicide	  rates.	  Both	  (Cárdenas,	  
2007)and	  (Rubio,	  1995)estimate	  that	  the	  high	  homicide	  rate	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  
cost	  Colombia	  2	  percentage	  points	  per	  year	  in	  economic	  growth,	  plus	  an	  additional	  
0.7%	  of	  growth	  through	  reductions	  on	  aggregate	  investment.	  	  Cárdenas	  similarly	  
finds	  that	  the	  “slow	  down”	  in	  total	  factor	  productivity	  Colombia	  experienced	  
between	  1980	  and	  2000	  was	  largely	  driven	  by	  its	  growing	  homicide	  rate	  and	  
inequality.	  	  Using	  a	  3SLS	  approach	  to	  directly	  test	  the	  impact	  of	  conflict	  on	  growth,	  
(Riascos	  &	  Vargas,	  2011)estimates	  that	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  
Colombian	  conflict	  slowed	  GDP	  per	  capita	  growth	  by	  0.3	  percentage	  points	  per	  year	  
on	  average	  in	  the	  1990s.	  	  This	  impact	  is	  primarily	  through	  a	  reduction	  in	  total	  factor	  
productivity	  growth	  and	  through	  a	  reduction	  in	  accumulation	  of	  capital.	  	  To	  deal	  
with	  omitted	  variable	  bias,	  	  (Borrero,	  2003)	  addresses	  department	  specific	  fixed	  
effects.	  	  His	  results	  find	  similar	  reductions	  in	  growth	  from	  increases	  in	  homicides,	  
kidnapping,	  and	  actions	  of	  illegal	  armed	  groups.	  	  	  	  	  
	   Recent	  authors	  have	  attempted	  to	  understand	  the	  channels	  by	  which	  
violence	  impacts	  economic	  growth.	  Camacho	  and	  Rodriguez	  (2010)show	  that	  firms	  
are	  more	  likely	  to	  exit	  markets	  when	  violence	  increases.	  (rodríguez	  &	  sánchez,	  
2012)	  also	  find	  that	  armed	  conflict	  exposure	  encourages	  children	  over	  age	  11	  to	  
drop	  out	  of	  school	  early.	  (Adriana	  Camacho,	  2008)	  even	  traces	  negative	  growth	  back	  
to	  the	  negative	  impact	  on	  infant	  health	  from	  a	  mother’s	  exposure	  to	  terrorism	  
during	  pregnancy.	  (Vargas,	  2012),on	  the	  other	  hand,	  does	  not	  find	  consistent	  
impacts	  of	  violent	  incidents	  on	  growth.	  	  	  
Dramatic	  inequality	  also	  threatens	  Colombian	  development.	  	  With	  an	  
income-­‐Gini	  	  coefficient	  of	  0.51	  and	  land	  Gini	  of	  0.86,	  Colombian	  inequality	  is	  
amongst	  the	  highest	  in	  the	  world	  (Cárdenas,	  2007).	  	  	  This	  is	  despite	  a	  trend	  in	  Latin	  
America	  towards	  a	  growing	  middle	  class.	  	  A	  growing	  number	  of	  Latin	  Americans	  
find	  their	  basic	  needs	  met,	  but	  feel	  they	  are	  lacking	  economic	  security:	  a	  growing	  
lower	  middle	  class.	  	  Cárdenas	  estimates	  that	  at	  least	  43%	  of	  all	  Latin	  Americans	  
have	  changed	  classes	  between	  the	  late	  1990s	  and	  the	  2000s.	  	  	  Intergenerational	  
mobility,	  however,	  has	  remained	  stagnant,	  with	  educational	  attainment	  remaining	  
largely	  determined	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  parental	  education	  levels.	  (Cárdenas,	  2007)	  
In	  his	  paper	  ,“Fiscal	  Policy	  in	  Colombia:	  Tapping	  Its	  Potential	  for	  a	  More	  
Equitable	  Society”,	  	  (Moller,	  2012)	  claims	  that	  the	  poor,	  in	  Colombia	  and	  other	  Latin	  
American	  countries	  are	  largely	  left	  out	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  development,	  feeding	  the	  
cycle	  of	  violence	  and	  stalling	  growth.	  	  The	  middle	  class	  has	  been	  the	  primary	  
beneficiary	  of	  social	  security	  transfers,	  and	  has	  been	  allowed	  to	  avoid	  paying	  taxes	  
by	  opting	  out	  of	  government	  services.	  	  A	  2010	  LAPOP	  survey	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  
majority	  of	  Colombians	  believe	  that	  the	  government	  should	  address	  inequality,	  and	  
42%	  are	  willing	  to	  pay	  higher	  taxes	  for	  this	  to	  be	  a	  reality.	  	  (Moller,	  2012)	  explains	  
that	  the	  tax	  base	  is	  far	  too	  small	  -­‐	  less	  than	  2%	  of	  Colombians	  “actually	  declare	  
income	  and	  pay	  personal	  income	  taxes”,	  because	  of	  the	  extremely	  high	  threshold.	  	  
Individuals	  have	  to	  earn	  three	  times	  the	  average	  household	  income	  per	  person	  
before	  being	  liable	  to	  income	  taxes	  in	  Colombia,	  and	  then	  tax	  exemptions	  are	  
available.	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  that	  	  “Income	  tax	  exemptions	  raise	  the	  Gini	  
coefficient	  by	  0.7	  percentage	  point	  and	  cost	  the	  treasury	  close	  to	  1	  percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  
revenue	  forgone”.	  Furthermore,	  “independent	  low-­‐income	  workers	  are	  penalized	  as	  
they	  are	  taxed	  presumptively	  at	  the	  source,	  without	  the	  right	  to	  reimbursements	  
through	  the	  filing	  of	  annual	  income	  declarations”.	  	  The	  current	  administration	  has	  
begun	  implementing	  policies	  in	  order	  to	  address	  inequality.	  	  
Despite	  the	  upward	  mobility	  trend,	  intergenerational	  mobility,	  a	  better	  proxy	  
for	  inequality	  of	  opportunity,	  remains	  stagnant.	  Educational	  achievement	  and	  
attainment	  remain	  strongly	  dependent	  upon	  parental	  education	  levels.	  Despite	  the	  
recent	  growth	  in	  pro-­‐poor	  programs,	  the	  middle	  class	  has	  benefited	  
disproportionately	  from	  social	  security	  transfers	  and	  is	  increasingly	  opting	  out	  from	  
government	  services.	  Central	  to	  the	  region's	  prospects	  of	  continued	  progress	  will	  be	  
its	  ability	  to	  harness	  the	  new	  middle	  class	  into	  a	  new,	  more	  inclusive	  social	  contract,	  
where	  the	  better-­‐off	  pay	  their	  fair	  share	  of	  taxes,	  and	  demand	  improved	  public	  
services.	  (Moller,	  2012)	  
Colombia’s	  economic	  convergence	  with	  the	  United	  States	  is	  in	  fact	  possible	  if	  
the	  country	  could	  resolve	  some	  of	  its	  major	  issues.	  	  Here	  we	  have	  developed	  the	  cost	  
of	  inequality,	  corruption,	  and	  violence	  to	  Colombia’s	  growth.	  	  In	  the	  next	  sections	  we	  
In	  the	  next	  sections	  we	  look	  at	  the	  history	  of	  ongoing	  violence	  in	  Colombia,	  the	  drug	  
trade,	  and	  possible	  ways	  out	  of	  a	  viscous	  cycle	  of	  illegal	  activity	  and	  violence	  that	  
hampers	  Colombian	  prosperity.	  	  	  
	  
III	  A	  history	  of	  violence	  
	  
	   Colombia’s	  history	  has	  been	  riddled	  with	  political	  division,	  unstable	  central	  
government,	  and	  civil	  war.	  	  Colombia’s	  struggles	  with	  common	  identity	  are	  rooted	  in	  
some	  of	  these	  political	  divisions.	  	  Unfortunately,	  the	  vacuum	  they	  create,	  is	  a	  perfect	  
environment	  within	  which	  the	  drug	  business	  has	  taken	  hold.	  	  	  
Founded	  in	  1848,	  Colombia	  was	  the	  first	  constitutional	  government	  in	  South	  
America,	  and	  its	  Liberal	  and	  Conservative	  parties	  are	  two	  of	  the	  oldest	  surviving	  
political	  parties	  in	  Latin	  America.	  A	  civil	  war	  ensued	  in	  1863	  leading	  to	  the	  creation	  
of	  "United	  States	  of	  Colombia"	  lasting	  only	  23	  years	  until	  the	  country	  finally	  became	  
the	  Republic	  of	  Colombia.	  (Meléndez	  &	  Perry,	  2010)	  These	  “United	  States	  of	  
Colombia”	  developed	  as	  self	  sufficient	  units	  because	  of	  the	  vast	  geographic	  
differences	  and	  separations.	  In	  fact,	  “geographical	  heterogeneity	  may	  account	  for	  
the	  breaking	  of	  Ecuador	  and	  Venezuela	  from	  the	  Gran	  Colombia	  a	  few	  years	  after	  
independence.”	  (F.	  Thoumi,	  2010a)	  	  
Unsurprisingly,	  internal	  divisions	  only	  continued	  to	  fester	  between	  the	  
bipartisan	  political	  forces,	  once	  Colombia	  transitioned	  into	  a	  Republic,	  occasionally	  
igniting	  very	  bloody	  civil	  wars.	  The	  most	  significant	  civil	  war,	  the	  Thousand	  Days'	  
War	  (1899–1902),	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  the	  cessation	  of	  Panama	  from	  Colombia	  in	  
1903	  with	  help	  from	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Two	  decades	  later,	  in	  1921,	  the	  U.S.	  
constructed	  the	  Panama	  Canal	  and	  paid	  Colombia	  $25,000,000	  for	  compensation	  
and	  recognition	  of	  Panama	  under	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Thomson-­‐Urrutia	  Treaty.	  
(Hudson	  &	  Library	  of	  Congress.	  Federal	  Research	  Division,	  2010)	  
During	  the	  late	  1940s	  and	  early	  1950s	  Colombia	  was	  engulfed	  in	  the	  more	  
famous	  bloody	  conflict	  known	  as	  La	  Violencia	  ("The	  Violence").	  	  The	  civil	  war,	  
centered	  around	  tensions	  between	  the	  two	  leading	  political	  parties,	  erupted	  after	  
the	  assassination	  of	  the	  Liberal	  presidential	  candidate,	  Jorge	  Eliécer	  Gaitán,	  on	  April	  
9th	  1948.	  The	  riots,	  known	  as	  El	  Bogotazo,	  began	  in	  the	  nation’s	  capital,	  Bogotá,	  and	  
quickly	  spread	  throughout	  the	  country	  claiming	  the	  lives	  of	  almost	  200,000	  
Colombians.	  The	  violence	  subsided	  during	  the	  decade	  of	  1953	  -­‐	  1964	  when	  Gustavo	  
Rojas	  deposed	  the	  President	  in	  a	  coup	  d'état	  and	  negotiated	  with	  the	  Guerrillas.	  	  
During	  this	  time,	  the	  military	  junta	  of	  General	  Gabriel	  París	  Gordillo	  established	  law	  
and	  order.	  	  (Hudson	  &	  Library	  of	  Congress.	  Federal	  Research	  Division,	  2010)	  
Jostling	  for	  power	  subsided	  when	  Rojas	  himself	  was	  deposed	  and	  
the	  Colombian	  Conservative	  Party	  and	  Colombian	  Liberal	  Party	  agreed	  to	  jointly	  
govern	  the	  country	  through	  a	  coalition	  called	  the	  "National	  Front”.	  Under	  the	  deal,	  
the	  presidency	  would	  alternate	  between	  conservatives	  and	  liberals	  every	  4	  years	  for	  
the	  following16	  years.	  The	  National	  Front	  ended	  "La	  Violencia",	  and	  subsequent	  
administrations	  attempted	  to	  institute	  far-­‐reaching	  social	  and	  economic	  reforms.	  
However,	  the	  political	  and	  social	  discord	  and	  contradictions	  between	  each	  
successive	  Liberal	  and	  Conservative	  administration	  made	  it	  impossible	  to	  reach	  
agreement.	  (Hudson	  &	  Library	  of	  Congress.	  Federal	  Research	  Division,	  2010)	  
In	  addition,	  discord	  with	  the	  compromise	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  leftist	  
guerrilla	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  FARC,	  ELN	  and	  M-­‐19	  	  who	  continued	  to	  fight	  the	  
government.	  The	  Revolutionary	  Armed	  Forces	  of	  Colombia	  (the	  People’s	  Army),	  
infamously	  known	  as	  the	  FARC,	  is	  the	  largest	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  guerilla	  organization	  
and	  has	  been	  at	  war	  with	  the	  Colombian	  government	  since	  1966.	  	  These	  groups	  base	  
their	  continued	  fight	  in	  the	  rampant	  inequality	  within	  Colombia.	  FARC	  funding	  
comes	  primarily	  through	  ransom	  kidnappings	  and	  taxing	  the	  drug	  trade	  out	  of	  the	  
South	  Colombian	  region	  where	  it	  operates.	  (“Profiles,”	  2012)Just	  like	  the	  FARC,	  the	  
ELN	  (National	  Liberation	  Army	  of	  Colombia)	  also	  fights	  for	  equality	  being	  advocates	  
for	  a	  Communist	  ideology	  and	  Liberation	  Theory.	  It	  is	  the	  lesser	  known	  of	  the	  two	  
Communist	  fighting	  groups	  but	  still	  has	  a	  sizable	  army	  of	  about	  5,000	  
guerillas(“Profiles,”	  2012)	  
M-­‐19,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  an	  urban	  rebel	  group	  that	  resides	  primarily	  in	  
Colombia’s	  major	  cities.	  Some	  of	  M-­‐19’s	  founders	  were	  actually	  part	  of	  the	  FARC	  but	  
broke	  off	  in	  order	  to	  expand	  past	  the	  rural	  areas	  and	  have	  a	  greater	  impact	  towards	  
their	  cause.	  However,	  their	  cause	  was	  identical	  to	  that	  of	  the	  FARC	  and	  ELN,	  to	  fight	  
for	  the	  poor	  and	  overthrow	  the	  greed	  that	  plagued	  the	  government.	  (“Colombia:	  
Information	  on	  the	  Former	  Guerrilla	  Group	  M-­‐19.,”	  2003)	  
During	  the	  late	  1970s,	  powerful	  and	  violent	  drug	  cartels	  emerged,	  most	  
notoriously	  the	  Medellín	  Cartel	  under	  Pablo	  Escobar	  and	  the	  Cali	  Cartel.	  	  These	  drug	  
cartels,	  in	  particular,	  have	  had	  extensive	  political,	  economic	  and	  social	  influence	  
throughout	  Colombia.	  The	  "8000	  case",	  the	  biggest	  political	  scandal	  of	  the	  1990s,	  is	  
infamous	  for	  revealing	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  cartel’s	  political	  influence	  extended.	  	  During	  
these	  proceedings,	  Colombia	  ultimately	  investigated	  the	  role	  of	  drug	  money	  in	  
electing	  Ernesto	  Samper	  president	  in	  1994.	  (“Ernesto	  Samper	  Pizano,”	  2013)	  These	  
cartels	  have	  also	  financed	  and	  influenced	  different	  illegal	  armed	  groups	  across	  the	  
political	  spectrum.	  (Hudson	  &	  Library	  of	  Congress.	  Federal	  Research	  Division,	  2010)	  
The	  first	  group	  of	  Autodefensas	  (far-­‐right	  paramilitary	  group)	  was	  formally	  
promoted	  by	  the	  Governor	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Antioquia,	  Alvaro	  Uribe,	  who	  
became	  President	  sixteen	  years	  later.	  A	  coalition	  of	  drug	  dealers	  and	  landlords	  
formed	  alliances	  to	  fight	  the	  leftist	  guerrillas	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  paramilitary	  
groups.	  One	  such	  group	  is	  the	  United	  Self	  Defense	  Forces	  of	  Colombia	  (AUC).	  	  “This	  
right-­‐wing	  umbrella	  group	  was	  formed	  in	  1997	  by	  drug-­‐traffickers	  and	  landowners	  
to	  combat	  rebel	  kidnappings	  and	  extortion.”	  (“Profiles,”	  2012)	  The	  AUC	  funds	  itself	  
through	  business	  investors	  and	  landowners	  who	  are	  negatively	  affected	  by	  the	  
guerilla	  groups,	  as	  well	  as	  through	  the	  drug	  trade.	  While	  initially	  a	  sanctioned	  
counterpoint	  to	  the	  guerillas,	  the	  militias	  began	  to	  look	  much	  like	  the	  guerilla	  
groups	  they	  were	  fighting.	  	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  carry	  out	  justice	  and	  keep	  the	  peace,	  the	  
Colombian	  government	  has	  extradited	  thousands	  of	  militia	  members	  to	  the	  United	  
States	  to	  face	  drug	  charges,	  however,	  many	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  and	  violent	  
members	  have	  escaped	  any	  form	  of	  punishment	  entirely	  leading	  to	  much	  criticism	  
of	  both	  the	  government	  and	  the	  paramilitary	  groups	  alike.	  (“Profiles,”	  2012)	  In	  
2005,	  the	  Colombian	  government	  offered	  the	  Paramilitaries	  a	  kind	  of	  truce,	  The	  
Defense	  and	  Peace	  Law	  offered	  the	  paramilitary	  groups	  an	  opportunity	  to	  disarm	  
and	  confess	  in	  exchange	  for	  sentences	  of	  a	  maximum	  of	  8	  years	  for	  their	  crimes	  and	  
most	  paramilitary	  groups	  agreed.	  	  (Acemoglu	  &	  Robinson,	  2012)	  
The	  new	  Colombian	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  included	  key	  provisions	  on	  
political,	  human	  and	  gender	  rights.	  As	  further	  testament	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  drug	  
cartels,	  the	  new	  constitution	  initially	  prohibited	  the	  extradition	  of	  Colombian	  
nationals.	  	  	  Because	  of	  ensuing	  controversy,	  the	  prohibition	  was	  repealed	  in	  1996.	  
(Hudson	  &	  Library	  of	  Congress.	  Federal	  Research	  Division,	  2010)	  	  The	  cartels	  
responded	  with	  terrorist	  attacks	  and	  mafia-­‐style	  executions.	  	  
More	  practically,	  the	  1991	  Colombian	  Constitution	  increased	  checks	  and	  
balances	  enhancing	  the	  role	  of	  Congress	  and	  the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  and	  reducing	  
the	  power	  of	  the	  President.	  (Meléndez	  &	  Perry,	  2010)	  	  Despite	  these	  reforms,	  
the	  bloody	  internal	  conflict	  between	  guerrilla	  insurgent	  groups	  and	  paramilitary	  
groups	  and	  effects	  of	  the	  drug	  trade	  continue	  to	  plague	  Colombia.	  	  President	  Andrés	  
Pastrana	  and	  the	  FARC	  attempted	  to	  negotiate	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  conflict	  between	  
1999	  and	  2002.	  The	  government	  set	  up	  a	  "demilitarized"	  zone,	  governed	  by	  the	  
FARC	  but	  repeated	  tensions	  led	  the	  Pastrana	  administration	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  
negotiations	  were	  ineffective.	  (Vargas,	  2012)	  
With	  the	  dual	  goal	  of	  ending	  the	  armed	  conflict	  and	  promoting	  a	  strong	  anti-­‐
narcotic	  strategy,	  Pastrana	  began	  to	  implement	  Plan	  Colombia.	  	  Signed	  in	  1999,	  Plan	  
Colombia	  is	  an	  agreement	  with	  the	  United	  States	  in	  which	  U.S.	  military	  and	  
monetary	  aid	  is	  given	  to	  Colombia	  to	  combat	  the	  drug	  cartels	  and	  the	  violence	  that	  
comes	  with	  them.	  (Echeverry,	  2004)	  
Supported	  by	  aid	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  President	  Álvaro	  Uribe’s	  
administration	  applied	  more	  military	  pressure	  on	  the	  FARC	  and	  other	  outlawed	  
groups,	  leading	  to	  an	  overall	  improvement	  of	  security	  indicators.	  However,	  this	  
improvement	  has	  been	  undermined	  by	  the	  Colombian	  Army's	  continued	  violations	  
of	  human	  rights	  and	  also	  questionable	  statistics.	  (Hudson	  &	  Library	  of	  Congress.	  
Federal	  Research	  Division,	  2010)	  
President	  Alvaro	  Uribe’s	  administration	  attempted	  to	  militarily	  defeat	  the	  
insurgent	  groups.	  	  Security	  throughout	  Colombia	  improved	  under	  Uribe’s	  watch,	  but	  
at	  the	  potential	  cost	  of	  human	  rights	  violations	  and	  civilian	  casualties.	  	  
Reported	  kidnappings	  showed	  a	  steep	  decrease	  as	  did	  intentional	  homicides.	  The	  
rate	  of	  reported	  abductions	  declined	  steadily	  for	  almost	  a	  decade	  until	  2010,	  when	  
220	  cases	  were	  reported	  between	  January	  and	  October.	  	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  
World	  Report	  2011,	  2011)	  An	  overall	  reduction	  in	  violence	  has	  led	  to	  an	  increase	  of	  
travel	  and	  tourism	  since	  2002,	  however,	  the	  American	  State	  Department	  and	  the	  
British	  Foreign	  Office	  still	  warn	  travelers	  from	  wandering	  into	  rural	  area	  where	  the	  
FARC	  and	  cartels	  reside.	  (The	  Economist,	  2006)	  
Colombia	  has	  experienced	  modest	  progress	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  insurgents.	  	  
The	  FARC's	  commander	  in	  chief	  Alfonso	  Cano	  was	  killed	  by	  security	  forces	  in	  
November	  2011.	  He	  was	  replaced	  by	  Timoleón	  Jiménez,	  who	  assumed	  the	  duty	  of	  
first	  commander	  just	  days	  after	  Cano's	  death.	  	  Jiménez	  is	  thought	  to	  reside	  in	  the	  
mountain	  corridor	  covering	  the	  Department	  Norte	  and	  the	  Bolívar	  
Department.	  (“Colombia,”	  2011)	  Following	  the	  	  demobilization	  of	  the	  prominent	  
right-­‐wing	  paramilitary	  group	  Autodefensas	  Unidas	  de	  Colombia	  the	  country	  has	  
seen	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  number	  of	  neo-­‐paramilitary	  groups	  that	  have	  been	  accused	  of	  
widespread	  murder,	  drug	  trafficking	  and	  Land	  grabbing.(“Profiles,”	  2012)	  
The	  drug	  trade	  supports	  this	  ongoing	  violence,	  and	  in	  turn	  many	  support	  the	  
rebel	  factions	  because	  of	  their	  dependence	  on	  the	  drug	  trade.	  The	  resulting	  chaos	  
allows	  drug	  traffickers	  	  and	  corrupt	  local	  officials	  to	  maintain	  local	  political	  
legitimacy.	  	  	  
	  
IV	  -­‐	  The	  web	  of	  the	  drug	  business	  
	  
The	  illicit	  economy	  has	  evolved	  over	  time	  to	  meet	  the	  fiscal	  needs	  of	  
competing	  players,	  and	  to	  adapt	  to	  changing	  counter	  narcotic	  and	  counter	  insurgent	  
policies.	  	  The	  ongoing	  civil	  war	  enables	  the	  narco-­‐economy	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  it	  
provides	  financial	  fuel	  for	  it.	  In	  Colombia,	  the	  production	  and	  sale	  of	  drugs	  is	  equal	  
to	  nearly	  4%	  of	  GDP.	  (Echeverry,	  2004)	  The	  war	  on	  drugs	  has	  entrenched	  the	  role	  of	  
insurgent	  groups	  in	  the	  drug	  business.	  	  As	  Thoumi	  (2010)	  explains,	  most	  repressive	  
anti-­‐drug	  policies	  increase	  risks	  to	  low	  level	  producers	  and	  lower	  their	  returns,	  but	  
have	  the	  unintended	  consequence	  that	  they	  increase	  the	  returns	  to	  the	  insurgents	  
who	  are	  able	  to	  offer	  protection	  and	  facilitate	  the	  trade	  in	  drugs.	  	  	  
Prior	  to	  the	  1990s	  the	  drug	  trade	  was	  largely	  limited	  to	  the	  Medellin	  and	  Cali	  
Cartels.	  	  From	  the	  1960s	  to	  the	  1990s,	  the	  focus	  was	  primarily	  on	  processing	  and	  
trafficking	  cocaine.	  	  The	  death	  of	  Medellin	  kingpin	  Pablo	  Escobar	  in	  1993,	  along	  with	  
the	  capture	  of	  much	  of	  the	  Cali	  inner-­‐circle	  (Colombian	  president	  Ernesto	  Samper,	  
elected	  in	  1994,	  was	  revealed	  to	  have	  risen	  to	  power	  as	  a	  result	  of	  financial	  backing	  
from	  the	  Cali,	  and	  therefore	  felt	  pressure	  to	  pursue	  the	  network	  to	  remove	  the	  black	  
mark	  against	  himself	  and	  his	  country)	  begat	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  Colombian	  drug	  
business	  in	  the	  mid	  1990s	  (“Colombian	  Labyrinth,”	  2001).	  	  The	  networks	  became	  
more	  dispersed	  and	  their	  leadership	  decentralized.	  	  These	  short	  run	  successes	  have	  
lead	  to	  the	  drug	  networks	  being	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  track	  down,	  and	  make	  it	  
challenging	  to	  target	  critical	  hubs	  and	  leadership.	  	  	  
Following	  the	  decentralization	  of	  the	  drug	  trade	  and	  the	  US	  strategy	  to	  
interrupt	  the	  South	  American	  drug	  networks	  by	  disrupting	  the	  so	  called	  “airbridge”	  
in	  the	  mid	  1990s	  (policies	  included	  tearing	  up	  small	  landing	  strips	  and	  shooting	  
down	  small	  planes	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  were	  involved	  in	  drug	  trafficking),	  which	  cut	  
off	  the	  access	  of	  Colombian	  drug	  traffickers	  to	  the	  producers	  in	  Peru	  and	  Bolivia,	  
Colombia	  became	  a	  prominent	  grower	  of	  Cocaine.	  	  Colombia	  also	  became	  the	  
Western	  Hemisphere’s	  leading	  heroine	  producer,	  producing	  a	  high	  quality	  lower	  
cost	  heroine.	  (“Colombian	  Labyrinth,”	  2001)	  
Colombia’s	  Cocaine	  growing	  continues	  to	  adapt	  to	  crop	  destruction	  tactics.	  	  
In	  2004,	  police	  discovered	  a	  new	  strain	  of	  cocaine	  plant,	  which	  drug	  traffickers	  
reportedly	  spent	  over	  $100	  million	  developing,	  that	  produces	  a	  much	  higher	  yield	  
(the	  plant	  is	  nearly	  10	  feet	  tall	  instead	  of	  normal	  5	  foot	  tall	  plants)	  and	  purer	  drug.	  	  
It	  is	  also	  harder	  to	  kill	  and	  easier	  to	  grow	  in	  inhospitable	  regions.	  (McDermott,	  
2004)	  Along	  with	  protecting	  plants	  with	  molasses	  to	  make	  them	  harder	  to	  kill,	  these	  
hardier	  strains	  account	  for	  how	  despite	  destroying	  nearly	  ½	  the	  coca	  crop	  with	  
aerial	  spraying,	  coca	  production	  has	  stayed	  constant.	  	  (Mejia	  &	  Restrepo,	  2009)	  
The	  cost	  of	  the	  narco-­‐economy	  can	  be	  measured	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  
dimensions.	  	  In	  coca	  producing	  regions,	  (Angrist	  &	  Kugler,	  2008)	  find	  that	  homicide	  
and	  other	  violence	  is	  notably	  higher.	  	  These	  regions	  also	  tend	  to	  attract	  clashes	  
between	  the	  government,	  which	  targets	  drug	  production,	  and	  insurgent	  groups	  who	  
protect	  it	  and	  gain	  funding	  from	  it.	  This	  leads,	  however,	  to	  these	  coca	  growing	  
regions	  becoming	  battle	  grounds	  with	  all	  of	  the	  civilian	  costs	  that	  that	  engenders	  in	  
Colombia’s	  ongoing	  civil	  war.(González	  &	  Smith,	  2009)	  	  
Yet	  despite	  these	  kinds	  of	  costs,	  coca	  still	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  giving	  
the	  insurgents	  a	  foothold	  with	  local	  populations.	  (Angrist	  &	  Kugler,	  2008)	  finds	  that	  
unemployment	  is	  reduced	  in	  coca	  growing	  regions.	  	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  
(2012b)	  elaborate	  that	  the	  drug	  lords	  and	  insurgents	  have	  created	  law	  and	  order	  in	  
the	  parts	  of	  the	  country	  where	  drugs	  are	  produced,	  and	  that	  most	  of	  the	  producers	  
were	  displaced	  from	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  country	  by	  the	  ongoing	  political	  violence.	  	  A	  
striking	  example	  of	  post-­‐government	  order	  occurs	  in	  the	  town	  of	  La	  Danta,	  
Antioquia.	  	  Here	  the	  local	  militia	  kingpin	  enforces	  laws,	  engages	  in	  taxation	  
including	  that	  of	  the	  drug	  lords,	  and	  invests	  in	  local	  community	  development.	  	  
(Acemoglu	  &	  Robinson	  	  2012b)	  
Insurgents	  further	  play	  a	  role	  in	  protecting	  the	  local	  populations	  from	  the	  
abuses	  of	  drug	  traffickers	  as	  well	  as	  in	  helping	  drug	  traffickers	  get	  their	  goods	  to	  
markets.	  	  Local	  populations	  are	  thus	  ingratiated	  to	  the	  insurgents.	  	  Attempts	  at	  crop	  
eradication	  only	  strengthen	  the	  bond	  between	  insurgents	  and	  local	  populations.	  
(Felbab-­‐Brown,	  2010)	  	  Keefer	  and	  Loayza	  (Keefer	  &	  Loayza,	  2010)	  reiterate	  that	  
crop	  eradication	  has	  increased	  the	  productivity	  of	  remaining	  coca	  crops	  in	  the	  
Andean	  region.	  	  
Political	  disparities	  and	  resentment	  towards	  the	  government	  help	  create	  the	  
environment	  in	  which	  coca	  thrives.	  	  Thoumi	  (2010)explains	  that	  to	  have	  a	  
competitive	  advantage	  in	  drug	  production	  a	  country	  needs	  to	  both	  be	  hospitable	  to	  
growing	  drugs,	  but	  also	  to	  having	  a	  complex	  illegal	  system	  that	  exists	  within	  its	  
borders.	  	  These	  kinds	  of	  countries	  must	  not	  only	  have	  a	  vacuum	  of	  power,	  but	  also	  a	  
place	  where	  social	  norms	  allow	  evading	  legal	  authority.	  	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  how	  
the	  web	  of	  violence	  grows	  with	  drugs	  	  -­‐	  the	  Medelin	  cartel	  had	  close	  connections	  
with	  law	  enforcement	  through	  helping	  establish	  a	  right	  wing	  militia	  to	  counter	  the	  
left	  wing	  guerrillas.	  	  	  
	   Most	  policy	  solutions	  to	  the	  drug-­‐violence-­‐poverty	  web	  depend	  on	  a	  more	  
lenient	  U.S.	  drug	  policy.	  (Krebs,	  Costelloe,	  &	  Jenks,	  2003)	  use	  a	  theoretical	  model	  
and	  simulations	  to	  argue	  that	  levels	  of	  interdiction	  would	  have	  to	  be	  to	  high	  to	  
effectively	  curb	  drug	  trafficking	  or	  that	  drug	  use	  would	  have	  to	  made	  legal	  to	  lower	  
the	  benefits	  of	  smuggling.	  	  Becker,	  Grossman,	  and	  Murphy	  (Becker,	  Murphy,	  &	  
Grossman,	  2006)	  similarly	  argue	  that	  taxation	  of	  legal	  drugs	  might	  be	  a	  more	  
effective	  and	  less	  costly	  way	  to	  reduce	  consumption.	  	  	  (Echeverry,	  2004)	  finds	  that	  
empirically	  the	  demand	  for	  drugs	  appears	  to	  be	  fairly	  price	  inelastic,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  
the	  war	  on	  drugs	  has	  the	  primary	  impact	  of	  increasing	  prices	  not	  reducing	  
consumption.	  	  Using	  similar	  simulations	  to	  the	  above	  authors,	  Mejia	  and	  Restrepo	  
(Mejia	  &	  Restrepo,	  2009)	  calculate	  that	  a	  three	  fold	  increase	  in	  US	  counter-­‐narcotics	  
funding	  would	  only	  reduce	  consumption	  in	  developed	  countries	  by	  15%.	  	  More	  
troublingly,	  Keefer	  and	  Loayza	  (Keefer	  &	  Loayza,	  2010)	  observe	  that	  prices	  for	  
cocaine	  and	  heroine	  have	  been	  dropping	  because	  of	  increased	  supply	  not	  decreased	  
demand.	  
	   The	  irony	  of	  the	  illegality	  of	  drugs,	  is	  that	  it	  further	  impoverishes	  the	  farmers	  
who	  produce	  it	  in	  addition	  to	  subjecting	  them	  to	  violence.	  	  Risk	  increases	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  crop	  eradication	  that	  poor	  farmers,	  often	  not	  viewed	  as	  criminals	  within	  their	  
own	  world	  view	  and	  community,	  are	  forced	  to	  endure.	  	  In	  addition,	  because	  the	  
crops	  are	  illegal,	  the	  profits	  to	  the	  grower	  are	  much	  lower	  as	  the	  trafficking	  network	  
requires	  greater	  compensation	  to	  get	  drugs	  to	  market.	  	  (Keefer	  &	  Loayza,	  2010)	  
The	  narco-­‐economy	  thus	  creates	  a	  kind	  of	  poverty	  trap	  whereby	  people	  
become	  more	  dependent	  on	  it	  because	  of	  the	  policies	  that	  are	  meant	  to	  destroy	  it,	  
and	  people	  become	  more	  tolerant	  of	  the	  traffickers	  and	  the	  insurgents	  because	  they	  
depend	  on	  them	  for	  their	  livelihood.	  	  Violence	  perpetuates	  the	  drug	  trade,	  making	  
people	  more	  dependent	  on	  durable	  crops	  such	  as	  coca,	  and	  it	  also	  provides	  the	  
financial	  fuel	  for	  violence	  to	  continue.	  	  It	  flourishes	  because	  of	  weak	  institutions	  and	  
in	  turn	  weakens	  them.	  	  	  
	   The	  challenges	  to	  Colombia’s	  peace	  that	  stem	  from	  drugs	  are	  multi-­‐fold.	  	  
Certainly	  if	  the	  narco-­‐economy	  were	  tamed,	  insurgents	  would	  find	  themselves	  
politically	  and	  financially	  disadvantaged.	  	  	  But	  the	  policies	  currently	  underway	  to	  try	  
to	  deal	  with	  the	  narco-­‐economy	  only	  entrench	  it	  further.	  	  	  
	  
V	  -­‐	  Unraveling	  the	  problem	  
	  
“I	  think	  we	  have	  to	  stop	  pretending	  to	  ourselves	  that	  all	  the	  violence,	  misery	  and	  
dissension	  that	  afflicts	  Latin	  America	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  plot	  hatched	  thousands	  of	  
kilometers	  away,	  as	  if	  we	  couldn't	  imagine	  any	  other	  destiny,	  for	  ourselves	  than	  
being	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  the	  global	  powers”	  Gabriel	  Garcia	  Marquez	  (Osorio,	  1991)	  	  	  
	  
	   We	  could	  argue	  in	  this	  section,	  that	  developed	  countries	  are	  to	  blame	  for	  
Colombia’s	  problems	  and	  that	  Plan	  Colombia,	  along	  with	  its	  failures,	  has	  entrenched	  
the	  rebels	  and	  created	  greater	  divisions	  in	  Colombian	  society.	  We	  could	  argue	  that	  
Colombia	  would	  be	  better	  off	  if	  America	  would	  change	  its	  drug	  policy.	  	  We	  could	  
argue	  that	  Colombia	  would	  be	  better	  off	  if	  America	  would	  simply	  stop	  spending	  
money	  on	  crop	  eradication.	  	  But	  America	  cannot	  untangle	  Colombia’s	  problems.	  	  	  So	  
we	  encourage,	  rather,	  forward	  movement	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Colombia	  and	  its	  allies	  to	  
find	  a	  peaceful	  solution	  to	  its	  problems.	  	  We	  think	  this	  solution	  stems	  from	  making	  
the	  whole	  of	  Colombian	  society	  part	  of	  the	  solution,	  including	  giving	  the	  FARC	  a	  
stake	  in	  the	  outcome	  of	  Colombia.	  	  We	  also	  believe	  it	  rests	  in	  tapping	  into	  a	  common	  
Colombian	  identity,	  intolerant	  of	  violations	  of	  law	  and	  violence	  against	  fellow	  
Colombians.	  	  	  
	   Arguably,	  the	  drug	  trade	  continues	  in	  Colombia	  because	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  common	  
identity	  across	  Colombia	  and	  feelings	  of	  distance	  from	  the	  authority	  and	  benefits	  of	  
the	  central	  government.	  	  Francisco	  Thoumi	  (2010)	  argues	  that	  comparative	  
advantages	  in	  drug	  production	  emerge	  in	  places	  where	  there	  are	  marginalized	  
ethnic	  groups,	  a	  weak	  central	  state,	  and	  internal	  conflict.	  Groups	  who	  have	  good	  
reasons	  to	  feel	  isolated	  from	  the	  state,	  often	  perform	  the	  bulk	  of	  illegal	  activity.	  	  
Additionally,	  social	  norms	  must	  allow	  for	  the	  evasion	  of	  the	  law.	  That	  is,	  a	  broader	  
segment	  of	  society	  is	  tolerant	  of	  undermining	  law	  and	  order.(F.	  E.	  Thoumi,	  2007)	  
This	  means	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  drugs	  is	  grounded	  in	  a	  problem	  of	  identity,	  and	  
Colombia	  must	  struggle	  to	  realign	  the	  identity	  of	  its	  marginalized	  groups	  with	  its	  
population	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  its	  legal	  structure.	  	  	  
	   Colombia’s	  cultural	  leaders	  have	  charted	  a	  way	  forward	  towards	  that	  kind	  of	  
common	  identity.	  	  Gabriel	  Garcia	  Marquez	  calls	  Colombians	  to	  identify	  with	  their	  
pan-­‐latin	  heritage:	  “to	  understand	  our	  current	  problems,	  we	  have	  to	  go	  back	  to	  the	  
time	  before	  the	  Conquest.	  The	  borders	  that	  were	  drawn	  between	  the	  Latin	  American	  
countries	  were	  only	  created	  to	  manipulate	  us,	  and	  still,	  whenever	  there's	  a	  need	  for	  
it,	  the	  cry	  of	  nationalism	  goes	  up.	  Obviously,	  that	  only	  sets	  us	  against	  one	  another,	  
stops	  us	  from	  seeing	  and	  feeling	  the	  problems	  that	  we	  have	  in	  common.	  Each	  
country	  has	  its	  own	  special	  circumstances,	  but	  what	  really	  matters	  is	  our	  underlying	  
common	  identity.”(Osorio,	  1991)	  	  	  Almost	  mournfully,	  Marquez,	  in	  the	  same	  
interview,	  asks	  for	  Colombians	  not	  to	  fight	  over	  issues	  of	  “inequality,	  oppression,	  
exploitation	  and	  neglect”	  but	  rather	  to	  answer	  such	  injustice	  with	  life.	  	  German	  
Arciniegas,	  also	  considered	  a	  very	  prolific	  Colombian	  writer	  and	  intellectual,	  was	  an	  
undying	  proponent	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  the	  success	  of	  Latin	  American	  culture.	  	  He	  
answered	  a	  series	  of	  pamphlets	  by	  Giovanni	  Papini	  who	  argued,	  in	  1947	  that	  Latin	  
America	  was	  a	  failure.	  	  He	  wrote:	  "America	  is	  a	  common	  project,	  of	  people,	  of	  
European	  immigrants,	  united	  with	  blacks	  and	  Indians,	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  what	  
[Mexican	  philosopher]	  Vasconcelos	  called	  the	  `cosmic	  man’."	  (Ambrus,	  1997)	  Sadly,	  
this	  voice	  feels	  all	  too	  lost	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  Colombian	  conflict.	  	  We	  cannot	  
overstate	  the	  importance	  of	  finding	  this	  kind	  of	  common	  ground	  in	  recreating	  an	  
identity	  to	  build	  an	  environment	  that	  fosters	  peace.	  	  	  
	  
	  
The	  Peace	  Process	  
	   The	  Peace	  negotiations	  of	  the	  Pastrana	  Government	  between	  1998	  and	  2002	  
were	  a	  dismal	  failure.	  	  The	  government	  granted	  the	  guerillas	  their	  own	  territory,	  
which	  the	  guerillas	  in	  turn	  used	  as	  a	  safe	  haven	  for	  securing	  their	  grasp	  on	  the	  drug	  
business	  and	  mounting	  future	  attacks.	  	  The	  Uribe	  government	  did	  its	  best	  to	  undo	  
the	  “peace	  process”	  escalating	  the	  conflict	  and	  the	  policy	  of	  drug	  eradication,	  in	  an	  
effort	  to	  make	  continued	  violence	  appear	  pointless.	  	  	  (Echeverry,	  2004)	  
On	  November	  4th,	  2011	  Alfonso	  Cano,	  the	  FARC’s	  leader	  was	  killed	  opening	  
up	  a	  new	  chapter	  in	  this	  conflict.	  His	  replacement	  Timoleon	  Jimenez	  is	  considered	  
one	  of	  the	  “least	  visible	  of	  the	  rebel	  commanders”	  (“Colombia,”	  2011)	  and	  it	  was	  
difficult	  to	  predict	  what	  his	  reign	  would	  mean	  for	  the	  vicious	  war	  that	  has	  lasted	  a	  
half	  century.	  However,	  despite	  continued	  armed	  conflict,	  the	  FARC,	  under	  Timoleon	  
Jimenez,	  agreed	  to	  participate	  in	  peace	  talks	  with	  the	  Colombian	  government;	  
leading	  many	  to	  believe	  there	  might	  actually	  be	  hope	  for	  a	  brighter	  Colombian	  
future.	  	  
There	  was	  much	  buzz	  and	  anticipation	  in	  the	  coming	  months	  for	  the	  peace	  
talks	  that	  were	  scheduled	  to	  take	  begin	  on	  October	  2012	  in	  Norway.	  Unfortunately,	  
despite	  all	  of	  the	  excitement	  and	  perhaps	  overly	  inflated	  hopes,	  the	  Colombian	  
government	  and	  the	  rebel	  army	  could	  not	  agree	  on	  anything,	  not	  even	  to	  jointly	  
participate	  in	  a	  temporary	  cease-­‐fire.	  (“Colombian	  peace	  talks	  resume	  in	  Havana,”	  
2013)	  
In	  order	  for	  the	  second	  round	  of	  peace	  talks	  taking	  place	  in	  Havana	  Cuba	  in	  
early	  2013	  to	  be	  successful,	  the	  two	  groups	  will	  undoubtedly	  need	  to	  make	  tough	  
concessions.	  	  	  Promisingly,	  the	  government	  argues	  for	  the	  FARC	  to	  legitimize	  itself	  
and	  use	  the	  political	  system	  to	  fight	  for	  its	  cause.	  But	  the	  Colombian	  government	  has	  
some	  hard	  choices	  as	  well.	  	  The	  FARC	  has	  had	  staying	  power	  because	  the	  Colombian	  
government	  has	  failed	  take	  the	  FARC	  and	  their	  voice	  seriously,	  and	  has	  not	  
adequately	  addressed	  many	  of	  the	  legitimate	  complaints	  that	  strengthen	  the	  FARC’s	  
cause.	  	  Without	  honoring	  the	  FARC’s	  legitimacy,	  the	  hope	  that	  they	  would	  behave	  
legitimately	  is	  unrealistic.	  	  Treating	  the	  FARC	  as	  a	  legitimate	  entity,	  despite	  its	  
distasteful	  past,	  may	  help	  facilitate	  peace.	  	  Addressing	  the	  issues	  that	  enrage	  much	  
of	  the	  population	  and	  give	  the	  FARC	  power,	  is	  even	  more	  important.	  	  	  
The	  FARC	  has	  legitimate	  issues	  they	  wish	  to	  address	  but	  it	  must	  also	  take	  its	  
role	  in	  creating	  peace	  and	  prosperity	  seriously.	  	  The	  FARC’s	  argument	  that	  “Land	  
ownership	  issues”	  are	  at	  “the	  root	  of	  the	  problems”	  that	  Colombian	  peasants	  face	  is	  
reasonable,	  and	  there	  are	  policy	  solutions	  to	  begin	  to	  ameliorate	  the	  inequality	  in	  
land	  rights	  in	  Colombia.	  	  	  The	  FARC,	  for	  its	  part	  however,	  has	  refused	  to	  be	  a	  
legitimate	  voice	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  Colombia’s	  poor,	  arguing	  instead	  that	  they	  “want	  to	  
denounce	  the	  crime	  of	  capitalism	  and	  neo-­‐liberalism”.	  (“Colombia	  Peace	  Talks	  
Launched,”	  2012)This	  position,	  obviously,	  is	  not	  tenable,	  and	  keeps	  the	  FARC	  from	  




Effective	  Drug	  Policy	  
	   Clearly	  the	  counter-­‐narcotics	  strategy	  of	  crop	  eradication	  has	  failed,	  but	  
there	  are	  barriers	  to	  making	  a	  crop	  replacement	  strategy	  effective.	  	  Crop	  eradication	  
policies	  play	  a	  role	  in	  entrenching	  insurgents.	  	  They	  potentially	  harm	  the	  
environment	  more	  broadly	  along	  with	  the	  health	  of	  peasants,	  though	  evidence	  to	  
this	  end	  is	  mostly	  circumstantial.	  	  More	  significantly,	  aerial	  spraying	  does	  not	  occur	  
the	  proscribed	  distance	  above	  the	  ground,	  which	  leads	  to	  damage	  to	  water	  supplies	  
and	  neighboring	  legal	  crops,	  making	  development	  more	  rather	  than	  less	  difficult.	  	  
This	  points	  to	  an	  overall	  lack	  of	  coordination	  to	  date	  between	  aerial	  spraying,	  
alternative	  development,	  and	  state-­‐financed	  infrastructure	  development	  (Sherret,	  
2005).	  	  While	  we	  argue	  that	  continuing	  aerial	  spraying	  is	  expensive	  and	  harmful,	  a	  
first	  step	  might	  point	  towards	  coordination	  of	  efforts.	  	  	  
There	  is	  mixed	  evidence	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  crop	  replacement	  programs.	  	  
Peru,	  through	  crop	  substitution	  and	  alternative	  employment	  programs,	  successfully	  
replaced	  nearly	  50%	  of	  its	  coca	  production(Mejia	  &	  Restrepo,	  2009).	  	  Promising	  
stories	  abound	  of	  communities	  in	  Colombia	  that	  have	  replaced	  coca	  production	  with	  
licit	  production.	  (Ferrer,	  2004)	  for	  a	  community	  that	  replaced	  coca	  with	  coffee	  in	  
Colombia.)	  Unfortunately,	  efforts	  have	  stalled	  in	  Peru,	  and	  in	  Colombia,	  because	  
although	  one	  region	  or	  project	  may	  succeed	  in	  replacing	  coca,	  other	  producers	  and	  
regions	  step	  in	  to	  fill	  the	  void	  in	  production.	  	  (Mejia	  &	  Posada,	  2010)	  
	   Many	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  make	  coca	  an	  attractive	  crop	  in	  certain	  regions	  
create	  challenges	  in	  replacing	  it.	  (Reuter,	  2010)	  enumerates	  the	  challenges	  of	  
successful	  crop	  replacement	  programs:	  	  one	  must	  persuade	  farmers	  that	  the	  
government	  will	  maintain	  its	  commitment	  long	  term.	  	  With	  political	  instability,	  it	  
can	  be	  difficult	  to	  convince	  people	  that	  the	  government	  can	  provide	  protection	  and	  
infrastructure	  to	  get	  more	  sensitive	  crops	  to	  market.	  	  In	  places	  where	  land	  is	  poor	  
quality,	  it	  can	  be	  hard	  to	  find	  substitute	  crops.	  The	  U.S.	  has	  reduced	  its	  funding	  for	  
crop	  replacement,	  relative	  to	  crop	  eradication,	  citing	  a	  lack	  of	  security,	  lack	  of	  follow	  
through	  from	  the	  Colombian	  government	  and	  the	  difficulty	  in	  finding	  crops	  to	  grow	  
in	  bad	  soil.	  	  	  
	   Perhaps,	  most	  persuasive	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  crop	  replacement	  works	  best	  where	  
it	  is	  grounded	  in	  cultural	  norms	  and	  in	  a	  greater	  policy	  of	  development.	  	  	  
In	  the	  story	  of	  the	  community	  that	  replaced	  coca	  with	  coffee,	  community	  leaders	  
claimed	  it	  was	  a	  way	  to	  help	  “reinstate	  values”.	  	  Strikingly,	  projects	  to	  replace	  poppy	  
crops	  in	  Afghanistan	  have	  been	  most	  successful	  when	  coupled	  with	  a	  push	  towards	  
Islamic	  values.(Byrd,	  William,	  2010)	  	  
	   There	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  glimmer	  of	  hope	  that	  the	  new	  peace	  process	  may	  lead	  
to	  a	  commitment	  by	  both	  the	  Colombian	  government	  and	  the	  FARC	  towards	  crop	  
replacement.	  	  President	  Santos	  has	  said	  that	  coming	  to	  terms	  on	  a	  policy	  for	  crop	  
replacement	  will	  be	  part	  of	  the	  peace	  process.	  (Stringer,	  2012)	  
Effective	  development	  could	  help	  ameliorate	  the	  grievances	  that	  drive	  the	  
FARC.	  	  Making	  the	  FARC	  a	  stake	  holder	  in	  Colombia’s	  future	  development	  could	  help	  
them	  cease	  being	  an	  impediment	  to	  the	  process.	  	  Moreover,	  if	  Colombia’s	  
government	  and	  warring	  factions	  are	  all	  involved,	  there	  is	  a	  chance	  it	  might	  be	  part	  
of	  an	  adequately	  total	  makeover	  that	  could	  move	  the	  economy	  in	  a	  better	  direction.	  	  	  
	   But	  if	  the	  peace	  process	  cannot	  work,	  if	  the	  two	  sides	  cannot	  be	  reasonable	  
and	  come	  to	  an	  agreement,	  our	  argument,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  is	  very	  simply	  one	  of	  
crowding	  out.	  	  Eliminate	  the	  need	  for	  the	  FARC	  by	  addressing	  economic	  grievances	  
and	  with	  a	  drug	  policy	  that	  decriminalizes	  growing	  Coca.	  	  	  The	  Colombian	  
government	  must	  exploit	  the	  inroads	  it	  has	  to	  make	  its	  people	  better	  off,	  and	  to	  
focus	  on	  development	  not	  winning	  a	  futile	  war	  on	  drugs.	  	  Colombia	  has	  experienced	  
incredible	  amounts	  of	  economic	  growth,	  and	  this	  growth	  ultimately	  gives	  Colombia	  
the	  potential	  to	  address	  unemployment,	  poverty,	  and	  shortages	  of	  food,	  medical	  
care,	  and	  education.	  	  Colombia	  must	  work	  to	  combat	  the	  corruption	  and	  violence	  
that	  diminish	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  this	  growth,	  and	  we	  hope	  that	  the	  Santos	  
government	  will	  continue	  on	  its	  course	  to	  address	  massive	  inequality	  that	  also	  
limits	  the	  benefits	  of	  growth.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  we	  think	  Colombia	  can	  unravel	  the	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